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author notes that, in recent months, many of the factual justifications for the war in Iraq have
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(quoting weapons inspector David Kay regarding pre-war assumptions about Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction: "We were almost all wrong").
This Note applies international law regarding the use of military force to the war in Iraq in
light of the information that was available in the months preceding the war, and the author stands
by this analysis. This Note argues that the nexus of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction,
and terrorism calls for a more flexible interpretation of the UN Charter's restraints on the use of
force. Saddam Hussein's Iraq failed to convince the United States that it did not constitute such
a nexus, so under the Core Interpretist Theory that this Note espouses, the analysis of the legality
of the war remains the same as if Saddam's Iraq did in fact constitute this threat. See, e.g.,
Anthony Dworkin, The Iraq War in Retrospect, Crimes of War Project, Sept. 14, 2003, at http://
crimesofwar.org/onnews/news-iraq3.html (arguing that "the failure to find weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq since the end of the conflict does not greatly affect the basic judgement about
whether it was launched in breach of, or in accordance with, the U.N. Charter").
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, after American forces invaded Iraq during Operation Desert Storm,
President George H.W. Bush ceased hostilities, allowing Saddam Hussein to
remain in power.' Twelve years later, with Bush's son in the Oval Office,
America again went to war with Iraq. This time, the goal was not the
protection of a small country overrun by Iraqi troops, but a "regime change"
whose primary purpose was the removal of Saddam.2 As America now tries
to stabilize the defeated country, questions still exist as to the legitimacy of the
war. Opposition came from all sides; Middle East leaders staunchly opposed
any military action against Iraq (especially with the Palestinian question
unanswered), and traditional American allies broke ranks in an effort to
prevent the war.3 These countries argued that a U.S.-led force to overthrow
Saddam without UN approval was an illegitimate use of force under interna-
tional law.4 They urged the United States to refrain from launching a unilateral
invasion against Iraq, believing that international approval in the form of a
Security Council Resolution was necessary before any military attack could be
made.5
While most of the world demanded UN consent, the United States, by
contrast, was prepared to take unilateral action.6 In the post-September 11
(9/11) world, the United States has concluded that preemptive action is
necessary to protect itself from its enemies. Gone are the days when
separation by two large oceans was thought sufficient to insulate the United
See Hugh Sidey, What Makes Dad Clench His Jaw?, CNN (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://www.
cnn.con2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/09/time.bush.family.iraq/index.htm (last visited Sept. 18,
2003) (arguing that had U.S. forces attempted to remove Saddam in 1991, it would have required
a "huge and perhaps unsuccessful search for Saddam, the breakup of the coalition of Arab states
and strain among European allies," along with potentially large American casualties).
2 "Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will
result in military conflict commenced at a time of our choosing." President George W. Bush,
Speech to the Nation (Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com2003/WORLD/meast/
03/17/sprj.irq.bush.transcript/.
3 CNN, France: Most on Council Oppose War (Mar. 17, 2003), at http://www.cnn.coml
2003/WORLD/meast/03/17/sprj.irq.int.reax/index.html; see also CNN, Arab Leaders Declare
Opposition to War ln Iraq (Mar. 2,2003), at http://www.cnn.con/20031WORLD/meast/03/01/
sprj.irq.arab.ministerslindex.html.
" CNN, France Warns of "Illegitimate" War(Feb. 26,2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/meast/02/26/sprj.irq.france.warn/index.html.
5Id.
6 CNN, Cheney: 'Survival of Civilization'at Stake (Jan. 30,2003), at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/ALLPOLITICS/0 1/30/cheney.speech/index.html.
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States from the troubles of the rest of the world. One of the lessons learned
from the World Trade Center attacks is that enemies can strike the United
States at any time from anywhere. After 9/11, the world has become a much
smaller place, and America has increased its emphasis on confronting threats
before they manifest themselves in attacks on Americans.7 President Bush
identified Iraq as one of the primary threats facing the United States, despite
the decade-long imposition of sanctions.8 Bush argued that Saddam was a
unique threat to the United States because he developed nuclear weapons,
stockpiled chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, aided al-
Qaeda, and was a "murderous tyrant" who may have been plotting attacks
against the United States. 9
Though the military action has been fought and won, a battle still rages over
the legitimacy of the United States' actions under international law. As the
world hegemon, the actions of the United States receive a great deal of
attention. If the United States does not act within the parameters of interna-
tional law-in this case if it invaded Iraq without proper authority-other
countries will have a justification to violate the law themselves. The United
States could unwittingly aid those who oppose it by establishing a dangerous
precedent. Furthermore, world opinion of the United States, already lowered
due to unilateral moves regarding the environment and missile defense, could
drop even further.'0 This increased hostility towards the United States could
have ramifications in other policy areas."'
This Note will address the United States' position under international law
regarding the preemptive attack on Iraq. Several issues present themselves:
Does the UN Charter allow non-defensive wars? If so, does it require Security
' See Laurie Kellman, Road to First Strike, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 20,2002), available
at http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/bush02O920.html (citing President
Bush's change in strategy from Cold War era deterrence toward pre-emptive self defense) (last
visited Oct. 6, 2003).
a Associated Press, Disarm, or Else (Oct. 7, 2002), at http://abcnews.go.comsections/us/
DailyNews/bush021007.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
1 Id. The editors note that the validity of these claims has come under significant
questioning in recent months.
10 Michel Martin, A Greedy Bully, ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2002), at http://abcnews.go.coml/
sections/nightline/DailyNews/foreign-joumalists020908.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2003).
11 Andrew Chang, International Humbug, ABC NEWS (July 1, 2001), at http://more.
abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/world010731-protests.html (last visited Sept. 22,
2003) (stating that in the Spring of 2001, "the United States lost its seat on the United Nations
Human Rights Commission, not so much because of the new administration's policies, but due
to a long history of irritating behavior in the face of the world body").
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Council approval? Did the United States have sufficient cause to go to war
without UN approval? In short, was there any scenario under which the U.S.
could legally launch a preemptive war with Iraq?
To evaluate the legality of American action against Iraq, this Note will first
examine the UN Charter and its various interpretations regarding the use of
force. It will look to the language of the Charter and examine several
interpretations commonly used. In coming to the conclusion that the war
against Iraq was permitted under international law, this Note will argue that
perhaps the most common interpretation of the UN Charter-that all non-
defensive wars must first be authorized by the UN Security Council-is not the
view most suited for the world today. The historical context of 1945, the year
the Charter was created, is very different from the present political situation,
and that interpretation of the UN Charter is no longer appropriate. A more
pragmatic approach is needed for the UN to become a more effective and
therefore more relevant vehicle for managing crises of the type seen today in
Iraq and North Korea. This approach allows one nation to take action in the
interests of self-defense provided sufficient justification exists.
This Note will then look to the circumstances surrounding the invasion of
Iraq to determine whether the use of force was authorized. The evidence will
suggest that the Charter may have permitted the war against Iraq. This
reading, of course, does presume a practical approach to international law,
does rely to some extent on precedent, and does take into account Saddam's
history of violence and aggression.
I1. BACKGROUND
On August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, captured its oil fields,
and forced its government into exile. On November 29, 1990, the United
Nations Security Council issued a Resolution that authorized the use of force
should Iraq fail to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.12 When that
deadline passed, U.S. forces, with an international coalition that included both
European and Arab nations, commenced hostilities on January 17, 1991."3
After a thirty-nine day bombing campaign and a four day ground war, Iraqi
forces were routed; however, Coalition forces did not remove Saddam from
12 S.C. Res, 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/RES/678 (1990) [hereinafter
RESOLUTION 678].
13 CNN, The Persian Gulf War, Prelude: Iraq Invades Kuwait (1997), at http://www.cnn.
com/SPECIALS/1997/iraq/9802/gulf.war.recap/prelude/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
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power.14 Instead, they allowed him to fend off massive uprisings and to
reassert his control over Iraq. ' 5 In an attempt to contain Saddam, the Security
Council passed Resolution 687, which has several relevant parts. 16
The Resolution first required Iraq to unconditionally accept the destruction
of all chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their related components,
and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers. 17 Further-
more, it required Iraq to submit a report to the UN detailing the amount,
location, and type of all such weapons. 8 Resolution 687 also called for a
weapons inspection program and economic sanctions that would be lifted once
the Security Council agreed that Iraq had completed all necessary actions. 9
Even though the allied forces declined to remove Saddam from power, the
Security Council enacted weapons inspections to keep him in check.
The weapons inspectors found a nuclear weapons development program
that was far more advanced than U.S. intelligence expected.' ° But while they
were able to dismantle what they could find, the inspectors were fearful of
what they were unable to discover." Saddam's government "admitted to just
a fraction of his missile and chemical stores and falsely denied the existence
of a biological program. 22 In fact, though investigators entered Iraq in 1991,
they did not even know of the existence of a biological weapons program until
1995, when Saddam's son-in-law defected to the United States. 23 Iraq
subsequently admitted to the program's existence, but claimed, without
offering any proof, that it had been dismantled.'
1" Chris Bury, A Tortured Relationship, ABC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2002), at http://abcnews.go.
com/sections/nightline/DailyNewsus-iraq-history1020917.html (last visited Sept. 21,2003)
("[T]here was a fear in the Bush administration that Iraq would fragment into ethnic and
religious groups .... 'And the fear was always if that happened, this would be anew opportunity
for Iran.' ").
is Id. Rebel forces at one point controlled parts of fourteen of eighteen Iraqi provinces. Id.
16 Id.
" S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. DOC S/RES/687 (1991) at
subsection (C).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See John F. Dickerson et al., What Does Saddam Have?, CNN (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://
www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/09/09/time.saddam.weapons/index.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2003). Reports of Iraq's nuclear capacity before the war estimated that it was five to ten
years away from building a bomb. Id.
21 id.
22 id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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Beyond merely not cooperating, Saddam used more devious tactics to avoid
discovery of his forbidden weapons caches. "Iraqi obstruction started early.
In the summer of 1991, after only two months of inspections, U.N. personnel
were stopped dead in their tracks in a face-off lasting four days.""5 Indeed, the
Iraqi noncompliance became a "ritual," with " 'gaps and inconsistencies,' a
'policy of concealment,' 'unaccounted for warheads,' 'wrong information' and
'disturbing incidents.' "26 UN inspectors
increasingly found themselves in a frustrating game of cat and
mouse with the Iraqis, according to former chief UN inspector
David Kay. "By 1993, '94, '95, every time the inspectors got
close to new material, [Iraq] closed the inspections down,
frustrated them, stopped them, and in addition to that they
maintained a very active concealment and deception program
designed to hide their program."27
As then President Clinton himself noted, "[T]hroughout this entire process,
Iraqi agents have undermined and undercut UNSCOM [United Nations Special
Commission]. They've harassed the inspectors, lied to them, disabled
monitoring cameras, literally spirited evidence out of the back doors of suspect
facilities as inspectors walked through the front door."28
Then, on October 29, 1997, Iraq announced that the U.S. contingent of
UNSCOM would be expelled from the country, calling them "agents of hard-
line U.S. policy."2 9 After UNSCOM refused to allow Baghdad to determine
the inspection team composition, its chairman withdrew the team.30 At the
time, he noted that Iraq could be conducting illegal activities in the absence of
the team:
I Kathy Slobogin, Strike on Iraq, CNN (Nov. 1997), at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/
1998/iraq/9803/weapon.searchlgane/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
26 Id.
27 Bury, supra note 14.
28 Text of President Clinton's address to Joint Chiefs of Staff and Pentagon staff (Feb. 17,
1998), available at http://www.cnn.con/ALLPOLITICS/I1998/02/17/transcripts/clinton.iraq/
index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
29 CNN, Chief UN arms inspector defends exit from Iraq (Nov. 14, 1997), at http://www.
cnn.com/WORLD/9711/14/iraq.un.butler/index.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2003).
3 Id.
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Already in the last 10 days when (Iraq was) moving toward what
happened in the last 24 hours, they started to impede our cam-
eras, move our equipment, prevent our inspections from taking
place. We can't see exactly what's happening now the way we
could before and so of course we are concerned that with our
backs forced to be turned away in that way, activities may be
taking place that are dangerous and illegal.3'
After the withdrawal of the team, the UN had no real method of evaluating
Iraqi compliance. Until the war, the UN only received evidence on Iraqi
weapons development from the Iraqis themselves.32 Due to its history with
Saddam, the United States was understandably reluctant to accept it at face
value.33
The United States was very concerned with the lack of information coming
out of Iraq. When the inspection teams left, they knew they had not completed
their mission.3 ' They believed that Saddam still had stockpiles of chemical and
biological weapons, Scud missile delivery systems, and perhaps most
importantly, the ability to restart weapons production quickly should he so
desire. 35 This knowledge, coupled with the firm belief that Saddam, during
UNSCOM's entire six-year presence in Iraq, continually frustrated the
inspections with the sole purpose of protecting his illegal stockpiles that he
unconditionally agreed to dismantle at the conclusion of the Gulf War, caused
alarm in the Bush Administration.36
It would be beyond the scope of this Note and the ability of its writer to
describe the impact that 9/11 had on the United States. Suffice to say that this
country was deeply affected and changed its outlook on foreign affairs. The
events of 9/11 brought home with brutal force the fact that the world was a
31 Id.
32 Dickerson, supra note 20.
31 That Saddam lacked credibility is beyond dispute. While inspectors were still in the
.country, "Iraq revised its nuclear declarations four times within just 14 months and it has
submitted six different biological warfare declarations, each of which had been rejected by
UNSCOM." Id.; Clinton, supra note 28. In addition, Iraq admitted the existence of a biological
arsenal only after Saddam's son-in-law defected. Saddam persuaded him to return with promises
of forgiveness and promptly executed him. Dickerson, supra note 20; Clinton, supra note 28.
" Clinton, supra note 28.
33 Id.
" Cheney: 'Survival of Civilization' at Stake, supra note 6.
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much smaller place and that people who hold hatred for the United States have
the ability to strike her from a world away.
The brevity of the Gulf War reinforced the position as world hegemon, and
even though sanctions were created to ensure Saddam divested himself of
weapons of mass destruction, there was never any doubt that his armed forces
were incapable of harming the United States.37 However, just as U.S. military
might continues to distance itself from its nearest challenger, the post-9/11
United States feels an acute sense of vulnerability. As al-Qaeda has brutally
illustrated, a non-military fighting force can inflict devastating economic and
psychological injuries.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, "stocks fell, oil prices
surged, the dollar tumbled and money flooded into Treasury bonds.- 38 Not
only did American markets "basically collaps[e]," but overseas markets
registered double digit losses.39 In addition to severe economic consequences,
massive terrorist attacks can give rise to a great deal of national psychological
damage. After 9/11, experts warned of widespread post-traumatic stress
disorder, including trauma "experienced vicariously by those who are some
distance away. ' 40
With this heightened concern over future terrorist attacks, including a new
appreciation of the destruction they can deliver, the United States turned a
watchful eye towards Iraq. After weapons inspectors left Iraq for good in
1998, few believed that Saddam had given up his forbidden weapons programs.
In fact, it was almost universally accepted in the West that he was intent on
their continued development.4 '
" See Johanna McGeary, Inside Saddam's World, CNN (May 6,2002), at http://www.cnn.
comI2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/06/time.saddamindex.htm. A former Iraqi tank commander
stated, "the army he left behind last year was in sorry shape, demoralized, underpaid and ill
equipped. Of the 33 tanks in his sector, he says, 15 were out of commission. In a land of oil
wells, there was even a shortage of tank lubricant." In addition, only a quarter of Saddam's
troops are considered "serious fighters". Id. These observations were borne out by the brevity
of conflict.
38 CNN, World Markets Shatter (Sept. 11, 2001), at http://europe.cnn.com/2001/
BUSINESS/09/I 1/markets.europe/index.html.
39 Id.
4 Jenette Restivo, Blow to the Psyche, ABCNEws (Sept. 12, 2001) (quoting Dr. Thomas
Ollendick of the Virginia Technical Institute), available at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
living/DailyNews/wtc-americanpsycheOl091 1.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
,' McGeary, supra note 37 ("[Saddam] sacrificed the well-being of the Iraqi people and
billions of dollars in oil revenues to keep the unconventional weapons he had before the Gulf
War and to engage in an open-ended process of acquiring new ones.").
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A Saddam-ruled Iraq with nuclear weapons would have been a grave
problem for American interests in the Middle East.42 American, and indeed
worldwide interests, are best served with a stable Middle East. In fact, al-
Qaeda has listed both American support for Israel against the Palestinian
people and the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia as its primary
reasons for attacking Western interests.43 Stability in the region would mean
an end to the Palestinian uprising and a greatly diminished need for the
presence of American troops. The United States views one major step towards
the desired stability in the Middle East to be a democratic Iraq.
44
Saddam is known as an opportunistic aggressor who will invade his
neighbors when he perceives weakness. 45 He has invaded both Iran and
Kuwait when he believed he could expand his territorial reach,46 and the Bush
Administration was convinced that, given the opportunity, he would invade
again. And even though his military was severely weakened after the first
Gulf War, had Saddam possessed nuclear weapons, he could have used them
to intimidate neighboring nations.4"
Since the end of the first Gulf War, the United States has been highly
suspicious of Saddam Hussein, as there has been documented evidence of his
development of weapons of mass destruction, as well as of his hatred for the
United States.4 Yet this information was not new. The sudden increase in
American resolve-the U.S. transformation from a Security Council member
satisfied to uphold sanctions to a country prepared to wage a unilateral
war-was a result of both this information and the new understanding of the
potential of terrorism.
As stated above, 9/11 brought home to the United States the potential harm
that terrorism can inflict on many different levels. Saddam potentially
combined the two greatest fears of the United States: a state sponsored
42 Id.
43 CNN, Reporter: Al Qaeda Issues New Threat (Nov. 18, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/WORLD/meast/1 1/16/alqaeda.threat/index.htnl (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
" CNN, Bush: Ending Saddam 's Reign Will Bring Stability to the Mideast (Feb. 27, 2003),
athttp://www.cnn.corn2003/WORLD/meast02/27/sprj.irq.bush.speech/index.html (last visited
Sept. 21, 2003).
' McGeary, supra note 37.
6 Id.
47 President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations (Sept. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2002fUS/09/12/bush.transcript/index.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
48 McGeary, supra at note 37.
4 See id. 'Down With America' banners, in English, greet visitors to the former Saddam
International Airport in Baghdad. Id.
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weapons program coupled with al-Qaeda's terrorist organization. Saddam
knew that using nuclear weapons directly against the United States would
invite immediate nuclear counterattack." Yet, had he allied himself with al-
Qaeda, he would have had an indirect means to inflict great harm. President
Bush noted this joint threat in rallying support for the war.5"
Almost immediately after 9/11, government leaders began to beat the war
drums regarding Iraq, as Senators such as Joseph Lieberman noted that efforts
to contain Saddam had failed and that the United States must "be prepared to
act alone." 52 President Bush stated, "We're taking him out," while Vice
President Dick Cheney told a Senate Republican policy lunch group that "[t]he
question was no longer if the US would attack Iraq.... The only question was
when. 53
Yet these statements were not couched as mandates to remove a tyrant who
oppresses his own people or may again attack his neighbors. They instead
contain a defensive tone, with Senator Lieberman advocating removing
Saddam as part of the war on terror.54 President Bush has stated, "Saddam
Hussein needs to understand I'm serious about defending our country. 55 This
statement demonstrates that the impetus behind removing Saddam was not just
an altruistic motive to make Iraq and the world in general a better place
(although that argument has certainly been made), but a real fear that Saddam
may harm the United States.
On November 8, 2002, the Security Council addressed this threat by
passing Resolution 1441 with a unanimous vote.56 The Resolution required
Iraq to provide by December 8, 2002, "a currently accurate, full and complete
declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological,
5 id.
51 President George W. Bush, Speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center (Oct. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html.
52 CNN, Lieberman Calls for Targeting of Hussein (Jan. 15,2002), at http:lwww.cnn.coml
2002/US/Ol1 5/ret.lieberman.terrorism/index.html.
" Daniel Eisenberg, 'We're Taking Him Out', TIME (May 13, 2002), available at http://
www.cnn.cornI2002/ALLPOLITICS/05/06/time.out/index.html.
"' Lieberman Calls for Targeting of Hussein, supra note 52.
5 John McWethy, President Says Saddam Must Go: Bush Administration Considers
'Regime Change' in Iraq, ABCNEws (Feb. 13, 2002), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/
DailyNews/iraq02O213.html.
56 Associated Press, A Breakthrough: After Weeks of Wrangling, U.N. Unanimously OKs
Iraq Resolution (Nov. 8,2002), at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/dailynews/iraq021108.
html (explaining that the United States had to give assurances that the language of this
Resolution would not be used as a pretext to automatically trigger military action).
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or nuclear weapons .... Furthermore, "false statements or omissions in the
declarations submitted by Iraq... and failure by Iraq at any time to comply
with ... this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's
obligations ... ,,5" Most importantly, Iraq must provide weapons inspectors
with "unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all
[sites] ... they wish to inspect. ' 59 The Resolution ended by reminding Iraq
that it would "face serious consequences" if it continued to violate the
Resolution.'
Iraq wrote a nine page letter to the UN decrying the actions of the United
States and Britain but saying it would comply with the Resolution.6 The letter
stated that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction and claimed
to welcome the opportunity to expose the "lies and manipulations" of the
West.62
UN inspectors reentered Iraq, but never found a "smoking gun. '6 3 They
did, however, discover empty chemical warheads omitted from the Iraqi
declaration" and reiterated that the declaration was incomplete.65 Though
Chief UN Weapons Inspector Hans Blix did indicate that Iraq had improved
cooperation, UN inspectors also found Iraqi missiles which exceeded the 150
kilometer range limit imposed by the UN.' Finally, the UN pulled out its
inspectors when it appeared that war was imminent.67
The U.S. military campaign, subjected to much early criticism, was one of
the shortest wars on record as President Bush proclaimed an end to major
fighting only six weeks after hostilities commenced.6 ' Almost immediately
after hostilities ceased, American forces began the search for weapons of mass
7 S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
58 Id.
59 Id.
6 Id.
6' Reuters, Acceding to Pressure (Nov. 13,2002), available at http://more.abcnews.go.com/
sections/world/dailynews/iraq021113am.html.
62 Id.
63 CNN, Baghdad: Inspections Show Iraq is Credible (Jan. 3,2003), at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/meast/01/02/sproject.irq.inspections/index.html.
" Associated Press, Dangerous Discovery (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.
comsections/world/DailyNews/iraq03016.html.
63 Id.
m CNN, Iraq Destroys More Missiles (Mar. 9, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2003/WORLD/meast/03/09/sprj.irq.niissiles 1130/index.html.
67 CNN, U.N. Inspectors Begin Withdrawal (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.
com/2003/WORLD/meast/03/18spr.irq.unindex.html.
I President George Bush, Speech On Board the USS Abraham Lincoln (May 1, 2003).
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destruction.69 To date, only circumstantial evidence of these weapons has been
uncovered, though White House officials remain confident they will be found
eventually.7"
I. ANALYSIS
Determining the legality of military attacks against Iraq depends on how
one interprets the UN Charter and international law. When the Charter was
first adopted in 1945, it anticipated future conflicts and established a
mechanism to confront them.7' Article 2(4) directed all member nations to
refrain from the threat or the use of force in international relations.72
Knowing, however, that states would be unable to uphold this lofty ideal, the
Charter created the Security Council, a fifteen member group (with five
permanent members) that primarily addresses matters of international
security.73 This group has the power to impose economic or diplomatic
sanctions on law-breaking nations,74 as well as to authorize military action if
those measures are inadequate.75 Giving strength to this power is article 43 of
the UN Charter which requires member states to make available to the Security
Council military forces that would compose a UN military body.76 Though
sole military discretion rested in the Security Council, the right to self-defense
was left intact." In theory, therefore, should one country attack another, the
attacked country would immediately take defensive measures while informing
the Security Council, who, if other non-military options were deemed
inadequate, could send UN troops into battle. In a sense, this UN military
69 See CNN, Arms Inspectors Look to Return to Iraq (Apr. 27, 2003), available at http:II
www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/27/sprj.irq.iaea/index.html.
70 Michael Duffy, Weapons of Mass Disappearance, TIME, June 9, 2003, at 28.
7' Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior
Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, at 53 (2001). This anticipation
is evidenced by the charter's attempt to establish Article 43 forces with which the Security
Council could maintain international peace and security. Id.
72 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
13 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
14 U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
75 U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
76 U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
77 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations ... ").
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presence would be a worldwide police force, reducing the need for unilateral
action.
This system reflects the political setting in 1945, and it failed because of
the onset of the Cold War.7 Cooperation among the allied nations during
World War II had been so great that it was believed that same spirit would
continue in the United Nations.79 Furthermore, all of Europe and much of the
Soviet Union was still devastated from the war, so the framers feared inter-
nation conflict on a massive scale and structured the Charter to address that
possibility.80 Peace (and by extension, sovereignty) was the goal, not justice.8'
That in part explains why the structure of the Security Council, with its five
permanent members holding veto power, enables those members to obstruct
any legislation they choose. 2 From its inception until the end of the Cold War,
the Charter has been at the mercy of obstructionist agendas empowered by
permanent vetos.8 3 So long as Saddam had an economic carrot to dangle in
front of one permanent member, he had an excellent chance of avoiding
Security Council-authorized action.84 Self-defense must then be the justifica-
tion used by America for any invasion of Iraq.
A. Iraq's Qualities
Unfortunately, the historical influences that developed the Charter did not
anticipate a nation such as Iraq. There are several factors that made Iraq a
" See Franck, supra note 71.
'9 Id. at 52.
" Pretextual claims of self defense often justified an aggressor's actions and thus, the Charter
sought to impose an objective and impartial means to determine the legitimacy of the use of
force. Therefore, no force was allowed unless an actual attack had occurred. Michael J.
Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense, WKLY. STANDARD,
Jan. 28, 2002, at 24.
"' Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'LL. 1, at 5-6 (1990).
82 Id. A classic example of this problem is the Korean War, which began with an attack by
North Korea against South Korea in 1950. Seemingly, this attack would be the precise type of
action which the Security Council existed to confront. However, because North Korea was
communist and therefore supported by the USSR, a Resolution authorizing force could only be
passed while the Soviet member was absent. Franck, supra note 71, at 53-54.
83 Arend, supra note 81. The framers did not anticipate the frequent use of the veto,
especially in the early days of the United Nations, to block nearly all possible actions by the
Security Council against aggression. Id.
84 Any permanent members with veto power could prevent authorization for war by
exercising their veto. Id.
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unique threat to the world and especially to the United States. Iraq was
commonly classified as a "rogue state," defined as "a state whose identity is
to some extent defined by acting outside of the standard rules of international
law."85 Saddam showed his disregard for international law on numerous
occasions throughout his rule. Most famously, his invasion of Kuwait was a
clear violation of the UN Charter on the prohibition on the use of force.
8 6
When the UN imposed sanctions after the Gulf War, it articulated specific
steps that Saddam had to take to become certified as compliant with interna-
tional lawA7 Yet over a decade later, Saddam's refusal to cooperate to the
satisfaction of the Security Council kept those sanctions in place.
In addition to being a rogue state, Iraq evinced a desire to obtain or develop
weapons of mass destruction88 and a disturbing willingness to use them in
battle. Saddam used chemical weapons on Iranian troops in the Iraq-Iran war
in the 1980s, and again in the 1990s on his own citizens during the Kurdish
uprising." Considering his propensity for using these weapons, there was an
understandable concern that, given the opportunity, he would use them on his
greatest enemy: the United States.
In addition to Saddam's disregard for international law, his attempts to
procure weapons of mass destruction, and his willingness to use them, Saddam
is notorious as one of the world's worst human rights violators.' Saddam
ruled with a paranoia that perceived any opposition or challenge as a threat to
his power,9' and those who threatened his power were often tortured and
executed.92 This oppressive, systematic violation of his own subjects' human
rights created a powerful moral incentive for a country to intervene. Yet
85 Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter
Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 735 (2002).
86 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc SIRES/660 (1990).
7 S.C. Res. 687, supra note 17.
s8 Though Iraq denied these allegations, it did possess biological weapons and had a nuclear
weapons program before the Gulf War. And despite its denials, the Security Council Resolution
demanding the return of weapons inspectors was passed unanimously, showing that even
traditional allies such as France, Russia, and Syria disbelieved Saddam's protestations of
innocence. U.N. SCOR, 4644th mtg., S/RES/1441 (2002).
89 Though there was no prohibition against the use of chemical weapons until 1997, their use
was generally condemned, as evidenced by the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol. Arend, supra note
85, at 742. The distinction between these types of weapons is slight, so that a willingness to use
one creates a legitimate fear concerning a willingness to use the others.
90 CNN, UKDossierSlamsSaddamon torture (Dec. 2,2002), athttp://www.cnn.comI2002/
WORLD/meastll202/sproject.irq.dossier/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2003).
91 Id.
92 Id.
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because Iraq did not attack another country, such an intervention would be
illegal.
Finally, there were allegations of collaboration between Iraq and al-
Qaeda.93 The prospect of Iraq's weapons program conspiring with al-Qaeda's
shadowy organization presented the possibility of Iraq using the terrorist group
as a proxy in its desire to harm America while avoiding the inevitable
retaliation. The UN Charter does not directly address this type of threat, and
guidance approving a self-defense rationale depends on the interpretation used.
Because the UN cannot guarantee worldwide security,94 and because rogue
states such as a Saddam-ruled Iraq pose such a serious threat, states have often
placed their own national interests ahead of the Charter and have used force
numerous times in contravention of the Charter.95 The legality of using force
in light of any UN failures has been a popular topic of debate, and three
theories have emerged. 9' Applying these theories-the Core, Rejectionist, and
Core Interpretist 9 7-to Iraq, especially in the post-9/1 I context, highlights the
strengths and weaknesses of each. Knowing that each theory has its flaws, it
seems that only the third, the Core Interpretist, provides the necessary
interpretation of the UN Charter and the applicable rules of force to provide
the proper balance of security and military restraint.
93 CNN, Rice: Iraq TrainedAl-Qaeda in Chemical Weapons (Sept. 30,2002), at http:Ilwww.
cnn.com/2002/US/09/26/us.iraq.alqaeda/index.html.
9" If the UN provided adequate security, an aggressor would know the futility of undertaking
war. This would reduce the threat of aggression and in turn reduce the need for anticipatory self-
defense. Glennon, supra note 80.
9 Since a use of force is legitimate in very limited circumstances--only for self-defense or
through Security Council approval--every instance of military action since 1945 has required
at least one illegal actor. For both participants to wage war in accordance with the UN Charter
requires the UN to approve an attack against an "innocent" country which then fights in self-
defense. Even conflicts with one side fighting according to international rules are rare; the
majority of military conflicts, such as the Vietnam war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Pakistan and Indian conflicts, and any number of African wars are fought without either party
obtaining Security Council approval.
96 An additional theory, that the Charter is a legally binding document that controls its
signatories' actions until formally repudiated, exists. However, in view of the numerous military
conflicts since 1945, it is evident that few of the signatories consider the Charter binding when
it conflicts with their own national interests. It therefore appears that the acts of the members
effectively negate any legal obligation just as formally as any written document could. Abraham
D. Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000)
97 Though there is no one name for these theories, I use those selected by Professor Arend
in his article, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms, supra note
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B. Core Theory
The first theory, the Core Theory," is a very strict, literal belief that any use
of force must satisfy the requirements of the Charter, meaning it must be in self
defense or authorized by the Security Council. 9 If a war does not satisfy the
formal requirements, it is illegal, no matter how just, even if it advances the
purposes of the Charter."° Humanitarian intervention and preemptive self-
defense, among others, are not legal uses of force under this view." 1 Not only
must the use of force be in response to an attack, but the attack must be
continuing; if the attacker has withdrawn, the counterattack must stop.10 2
This approach does have its advantages. It provides a very clear standard
concerning the use of force. The justifications used by previous aggressors
would be insufficient smokescreens to cloud the nature of the aggression or
prevent the Security Council from acting. In an ideal world, where all nations
conform their action to the Charter, war would virtually cease.
Yet, clearly we do not live in such a world. A lofty rule that ignores reality
is in danger of itself being ignored. Economics teaches us that a cartel is very
difficult to maintain because whenever its members set a price for their goods,
there always exists an incentive for each member to undercut the group for its
own advantage. The same is true under the Core Theory. If one state knows
that it can act to its benefit in any manner, short of armed attack, and avoid
military repercussions, it then has an incentive to follow its national interests,
to the detriment of its neighbors, so long as it is prepared to pay the economic
and diplomatic price.0 3
98 Id.
99 Sofaer, supra note 96.
'00 Id. at 2-3.
01 "Moral values-even those enshrined in the Charter-cannot be invoked to justify uses
of force." Id. at 5 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law", NAT'L INTEREST,
Winter 1989/90, at 9). The necessity requirement of self-defense would not have justified
Operation Desert Storm had Iraq merely raided Kuwait, and immediately withdrawn. Walter
Gary Sharp, Sr., Special Feature: Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the Lawfulness of NA TO's
Use of Military Force to Defend Kosovo, 23 MD. J. INT'LL. & TRADE 295, at 312 (1999).
102 This is a natural extrapolation of the definition of self-defense. Once the threat is
removed, no need for defense exists. Therefore, in theory, if one country launches a massive raid
on another, but withdraws before the defender can engage, no military recourse exists for the
victimized country.
03 Not only would the Core Theory have prevented NATO from intervening in Kosovo to
prevent ethnic cleansing, but Yugoslav President Slobadan Milosevic was "sufficiently confident
in the 'push-button' view to invoke international law by filing suit in the International Court of
Justice against participating NATO states." Sofaer, supra at note 96, at 3. Clearly, Milosevic
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This view, then, would have been most advantageous to Saddam. His
propensity to break international law would never be corrected so long as he
was willing to suffer through sanctions.0 4 Yet provided he did not attack
another state, Core Theory rules out military action, leaving only sanctions.
After more than a decade, there was little reason to suspect that sanctions
would ever render him harmless. Yet in spite of the inadequacy of alternatives,
without a Security Council Resolution authorizing force against Iraq, the Core
Theory would make any counterattack illegal.
This theory is fatally flawed, however, because the international collabora-
tion envisioned in 1945 never took place. The Cold War divided the world
into two competing camps that "cooled the impetus for globalist solutions."' 5
Therefore, no permanent UN forces were made available per Article 43, as
Eastern bloc nations and the West began to view each other with suspicion and
distrust."'6 The United States could not rely on UN forces to contain Saddam
and correct any problems he might cause.
Finally, as laudable a goal as peace may be, it may conflict with national
interests, or even the purposes of the Charter. Preserving the peace can, at
times, come at the expense of human rights, criminal justice, or any number of
factors that can provide a state with incentives to act militarily.'0 7 The Core
Theory does not allow any of these factors to influence or authorize a decision
to go to war. Unfortunately, these factors at times compel a state to act in
violation of the Charter, and other times, these factors may dictate a moral duty
to use force.'0 8
A rogue state's drive to obtain nuclear weapons also exposes a critical
problem with this theory. Though atomic weapons had been developed before
1945, the convention had no way of foreseeing their destructive power or their
believed that the Core Theory view would allow him to institute his purely domestic ethnic-
cleansing agenda by prohibiting intervention.
" Indeed, while under sanctions, Saddam still built ornate palaces, amassed great wealth, and
retained absolute power. The people of Iraq were the ones adversely affected by the sanctions.
McGeary, supra note 37.
105 Franck, supra note 71, at 53.
106 Id.
107 If a dictator ruthlessly suppresses an ethnic minority within his own borders, a neighboring
country primarily composed of that minority may feel obligated to intervene, despite the lack of
threat to its own territorial integrity.
,OB Note that the intervention in Kosovo was never claimed to be self-defense, rather NATO
countries used moral and political reasoning (ethnic cleansing, threat of regional destabilization)
to justify their actions. Sharp, supra note 101, at 318-20.
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destabilizing effect.'09 Their power is such that an attack could cost millions
of lives and devastate entire cities. Saddam's history of aggression and
ruthlessness suggested that he would use them if it was to his advantage;
however, the Core Theory would prevent another country from acting until it
had actually fallen victim to their use. Though peace is certainly an important
goal, the stakes with weapons such as these are too high to require a nation to
wait until attacked to use force. Following this requirement could result in
state annihilation, "' while ignoring it makes the Charter irrelevant."' Neither
result is desirable, and, therefore, the Core Theory cannot survive as nuclear
weapons proliferate." 2
Finally, this theory would not have allowed the United States to attack Iraq
even if concrete evidence had surfaced that it operated in cooperation with al-
Qaeda. Because of the Charter's emphasis on stopping interstate warfare,
other more devious methods have developed such as surrogate warfare, "waged
indirectly by subversion and covert foreign intervention in civil wars. This
was not the kind of traditional 'armed attack' against which the 'inherent right
of . . .self-defense' was designed to provide protection.""' Because the
International Court of Justice has ruled a defending state may not intervene in
a country from which the surrogate force originates,' the Core Theory would
not recognize any attack on the sponsoring nation as self-defense. Therefore,
theoretically, Saddam would be free to give weapons of mass destruction to al-
Qaeda to use against America without fear of military consequences.
This war illustrates a conflict that arguably advanced the Charter's aims,
yet this interpretation of the Charter would not have allowed any action. If the
'0 Arend, supra note 85, at 742.
10 Louis Rene Beres, Striking "First": Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International
Law, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L& COMP. L.J. 1, 5 (1991).
"' The UN may have indirectly endorsed this view when it failed to criticize Israel for its
preemptive attacks in 1956 and 1967. Franck, supra note 71, at 59. Even the International
Court of Justice "was unable to decide definitively whether an otherwise unlawful act-recourse
to nuclear weapons in anticipatory self-defense-would be lawful if the very existence of the
state were threatened." Id. at 60 (citing 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict).
I. Recently, North Korea, itself a "rogue state," has claimed to be a nuclear power.
Unfortunately, if North Koreadoes indeed possess nuclear weapons, U.S. options are much more
limited than they would be had this crisis occurred before the weapons were developed.
Christopher Dickey, No, Saddam is Worse, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 13, 2003, at 31. The dramatically
increased difficulty in addressing the problem is another reason why intervention cannot be
predicated on an actual attack.
113 Franck, supra note 71, at 57.
"4 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 L.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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Charter values peace and sovereignty, then it should not be tied to an
interpretation that does not advance those goals most effectively. True, the
Core Theory does have a clear standard of when war is justified; however, that
standard may only encourage violence and vigilantism. If it had been proved
that Saddam was aiding al-Qaeda, then application of the Core Theory would
have two results.
First, any help that al-Qaeda receives directly increases the violence and
potential for war. If the United States, or any similarly situated country, can
stop the source of their support, the conflict will end or diminish in intensity.
Conversely, additional support to the surrogate will prolong the violence.
Proponents may argue that the Core Theory has prevented wider war in past
eras such as in Vietnam or during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The
Cold War and its policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, however, played the
key role in preventing the escalation of conflicts. 1 5 The Core Theory cannot
claim sole responsibility for containing war then, and its use could actually
have the opposite effect now.
The second result upon applying the Core Theory, if Iraq had been proven
to be conducting surrogate warfare against the United States through al-Qaeda,
is a greater chance of unilateral action. A pressing national interest to act
against Iraq, combined with the minimal help that the Charter provides, creates
a greater incentive for the United States to ignore the Charter. Just as
following this interpretation in the face of nuclear proliferation results in either
state destruction or Charter irrelevance, in the age of surrogate warfare,
continued reliance results in prolonged conflicts or Charter irrelevance. The
Core Theory cannot address either of these problems, and neither of these
options are desirable. Therefore, it is obsolete after 9/11.
C. Rejectionist Theory
The second theory is less an interpretation than a belief. The Rejectionist
sees the flaws in the Core Theory and has followed the second path discussed
"I For example, the North Vietnamese Army was given great support from the Soviet Union,
yet the United States limited its fighting to Vietnam. When the roles were reversed in
Afghanistan, the Soviets similarly never attacked their greatest enemy, the United States, despite
American assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters. International pressure undoubtedly played
some role in these decisions; however, the knowledge of the consequences of such an invasion
and the potential for nuclear war made any attack out of the question. See generally JOHN LEWIS
GADDIS ETAL., EDS., COLD WAR STATESMEN CoNFRONT THE BOMB: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY SINCE
1945 (1999).
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above. Frustrated by the Charter's inability to "justify legally what they
consider so palpably proper and politically essential. . . .render[ing] the
civilized world helpless to deal with such patently lawless and inhumane
conduct," the Rejectionist does not believe that the UN Charter is a "proper
guide for the use of force in international affairs.""' 6
In addition to the Charter's ineffectiveness, the Rejectionist argues that
individual state practice is so "far removed from any reasonable interpretation"
of the Core Theory that the Charter "does not in any meaningful way constitute
existing law.""... Because national interests sometimes conflict with the
Charter, and because states follow their national interests at the expense of the
Charter, the "authority and control of the norm have essentially disap-
peared." '
If Core Theorists could be called idealists, then Rejectionists would be
realists. Fast adherence to the Core Theory interpretation of the Charter would
have prevented any international war since 1945. Though the Cold War is
often noted for the absence of large scale conflicts, there was no shortage of
military confrontations. 9
If the actions of states do not reflect any inhibition by international law, it
may be accurate to say that international anarchy exists. 20 But the simple fact
that the use of force has been nearly universally illegal does not warrant an
abandonment of the Charter and the ideals it espouses. One does not need to
be an expert in international relations to see the danger of accepting this
theory. In an anarchical system, there is nothing to curb self-interested actions.
Saddam, or any other tyrant, would have total freedom to oppress his people,
develop nuclear weapons, and cooperate with al-Qaeda to harm the United
States. With no organized opposition, the only resistance would come from his
next victim. Divide and conquer has long been the preferred tactic of the
aggressor. Before the Gulf War, Saddam had one of the world's largest
armies, with over one million men.' 2' If no international law existed to brand
116 Sofaer, supra note 96, at 4-5.
117 Arend, supra note 81, at 27.
"1 Id.
" The 'Containment Policy,' the Soviet revolution against capitalism, African wars, etc.,
made warfare common in every part of the planet. However, the superpowers never directly
fought one another in part because, to do otherwise would have involved NATO and the Warsaw
Pact, making world war and nuclear war likely. See generally GADDIS, supra note 115.
120 "[l]t is [the Rejectionist] approach that seems to offer the most accurate description of the
contemporary jus ad bellum." Arend, supra note 81, at 28.
121 See Marc Erikson, Iraq: In All but Name, the War's On, Asia Times Online (Aug. 17,
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his actions illegal, he could have attacked any nation; and were he wise enough
to attack one without a powerful ally, there would have been no one to stop
him.
Besides greatly empowering the aggressor, the Rejectionist view makesjust
intervention harder in additional ways. There would be no "legitimate" system
to counter a tyrant such as Saddam. Many countries rejected military action
without UN consent.'22 The Rejectionist Theory would have closed that
avenue, even if the United States desired to act within the UN system.
Coalitions such as those used in the Gulf War or in Afghanistan after 9/11
would be much harder to organize without a body such as the UN issuing the
call for support. Other Arab nations would view any U.S. involvement with
greater suspicion and be less inclined to cooperate without the umbrella of
objective authorization. Though this theory may provide short-term benefits
to America such as facilitating invasion by removing legal concerns, long term
interests, such as American-Arab cooperation and the war on terror, would be
greatly harmed.
D. Core Interpretist Theory
If strict adherence to the Charter language is impossible, its rejection may
be even worse. This problem has prompted scholars to search for a middle
ground, one that would preserve the system, allow for flexibility, yet create a
satisfactory precedent for future crises. The resulting theory, the Core
Interpretist Theory,'23 most closely strikes this equilibrium. This theory does
not hold that the core of Article 2(4) is coextensive with its language, instead
encompassing only the ideals of Article 2(4) that aggressive, unjust war should
be illegal. 124
Clear aggression and the content of article 2(4) and 51 would, in
turn, be defined by reference to established traditions of norma-
tive reasoning, such as prudence and just war doctrine, in an open
2002), at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle-East/DH17Ak03.html ("Iraqi ground forces
now number 375,000, less than 40 percent of their 1990 pre-Gulf-War strength.").
2 CNN, France, Germany Stand Firm on Iraq (Jan. 22,2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
WORLD/meast/01/22/sproject.irq.schroeder.chirac/index.html.
" Also called the Common-Lawyer theory. Sofaer, supra note 96, at 8.
124 Arend, supra note 81, at 25-27.
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interpretative process similar, in fact, to that already underlying
state decision-making.... 125
This approach requires "an evaluation of all the circumstances relevant to
such actions under the Charter and other applicable legal principals.' 6 The
flaw of the Core Theory was to attempt to create a standard that covered every
situation, but in reality, "it is no more feasible or desirable to attempt to define
aggression 'once and for all' than it is so to define any other legal term or
concept of international or municipal law.
1 27
Adaptability is one of the Core Interpretist view's key assets. By not tying
down the definition of aggression, the system remains free to develop with
changing world events. UN approval can be more easily given if a broader
spectrum of legitimate uses of force is recognized. Though the spectrum is
fairly nebulous, it incorporates other forms of international law, such as human
rights, violations of international law, and of course, self-defense.
[L]egality is resolved through a process of weighing relevant
facts against the standards and purposes of the Charter rather than
by examining whether a situation meets the prerequisites of one
of a number of particular categories considered necessary to
establish legitimate action.12 1
Of course, this interpretation's biggest asset is also its biggest weakness.
Just as the Core Theory's strength is that it provides a clear standard, the Core
Interpretist Theory is attacked for its imprecise limits. Charter literalists fear
that by allowing other justifications and consideration of all circumstances,
aggressors may go unpunished. 2 9 With any increase in "malleability" comes
an increase in the number of legal wars. 30
Yet this fear does not render the theory inoperable. The "use of force
carries with it a heavy burden of justification" and the attacking state would
"~ Id. at 25. Quoting Alberto R. Coil, The Limits of Global Consciousness and Legal
Absolutism: Protecting International Law from Some of its Best Friends, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J.
599, 620.
126 Sofaer, supra note 96.
127 Id. (quoting MYRES S. McDoUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FEUCIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 151-53 (1961) (citation omitted)).
2 Sofaer, supra note 96.
29 Id. at 16.
130 Id.
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presumably carry the burden of proof."' And while it is true that such a view
may encourage an aggressor to attack first and justify later, such actions are
already commonplace.' Furthermore, the standards are largely in place and
can be gleaned from existing international law.'" The inclusion of customary
law into the Charter under the Core Interpretist view allows flexibility and
security along with some measure of certainty:
Customary international law, defined as the unwritten body of
rules or norms derived from the practice and opinion of states,
need not take long to develop, so long as a particular practice of
states is uniform .... And once customary international law
develops, that development can form a reinterpretation of U.N.
Charter law consistent with state practice. 
34
This view, therefore, could allow humanitarian intervention. Without
specifically saying so, NATO and the United States justified their actions in
Yugoslavia under this theory.135 Despite the lack of Security Council approval,
NATO and the United States argued that the massive human rights violations
perpetrated by Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic demanded action.' 36
Sovereignty is still a key component of international law-a war for territorial
aggrandizement would be illegal under the Core Interpretist Theory' 3 -and
as the human rights justification was controversial even in the extreme case of
"' Id. Note also that Iraq's claim that Kuwait was historically part of Iraqi territory did not
deter the Security Council from acting, while Israel's preemptive attacks in 1956 and 1967
brought about no U.N. action. Franck, supra note 71, at 59.
"I Twice Israel has claimed self-defense after preemptive attacks, and all other "illegal"
attacks by other nations have been followed byjustifications. Miriam Sapiro, The Shifting Sands
of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, at 601 (2003) (describing Israel's
justifications of its 1967 attack on Egypt and its 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear facility).
Therefore, the timing of the justification will not see any change under the Core Interpretist view.
" Sofaer, supra note 96.
' Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality
Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the September 11 Attacks, 88
CoRNELLL. REV. 155, 205-06 (2002).
" '"e Clinton Administration (and NATO)... issued a statement of the circumstances that
it claimed justified the action [in Yugoslavia]." Sofaer, supra note 96. at 3.
136 Id. at 12. NATO and the United States also argued self-defense under Article 51, saying
that the conflict was a threat to regional stability. Ryan Hendrickson, Article 51 and the Clinton
Presidency: Military Strikes and the U.N. Charter, 19 B.U. INT'LL.J. 207, 217 (2001).
137 Arend, supra note 81, at 25.
2004]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
Yugoslavia, the less offensive Iraqi violations would probably not justify an
invasion. 3 '
Many argued that the United States' best rationale for attacking Saddam
was his systematic violation of international law.' 39 Human rights violations
aside, Saddam was isolated by Security Council sanctions for twelve years due
to his failure to comply with UN Resolution 687."4 His early lack of
cooperation with weapons inspectors and his later eviction of the teams despite
Security Council demands for readmission 4 are compelling evidence of his
disregard for international law. Due to the nature of the repeated infractions,
Saddam's actions are very serious and high-profile.
By invading Iraq and deposing Saddam, the United States made a forceful
statement for compliance with international law. This statement, in turn, could
lend authority and strength to future Security Council Resolutions. Other
violators of international law would feel the deterrent effects of an attack on
Iraq, similar to the message sent by the UN when evicting Iraq from Kuwait in
1991.
Along similar lines, the United States has asserted that the original Gulf
War cease-fire justified military action today.1 2 "When the Gulf War ended
in February 1991, the [Security Council] suspended the authority to wage war
and authorized a cease-fire contingent on Saddam Hussein's agreement to
dismantle his weapons of mass destruction under the terms of a UN inspection
regime."'" In this view, his continued failure to abide by his agreement
revoked the cease-fire, thereby allowing the United States to re-institute a state
of war.
Both of these rationales are probably sufficient grounds for intervention
under the Core Interpretist Theory of international law. When "weighing
" Sofaer, supra note 96, at 2-4 (noting that criticisms of NATO's action in Yugoslavia may
be "soundly based," despite compelling humanitarian considerations supporting such action).
,39 Bush's most modest argument for retaliation may be his strongest. Punishing
a state that has repeatedly failed to comply with its international obligations
is an important way of enforcing international law. [S]ome governments and
scholars have argued that states may use armed reprisals in limited circum-
stances to step in the shoes of the United Nations when it fails to protect the
peace.
Stephanie Giry, New War, Old Law, 2003 Legal Aff. 21.
"4 Dickerson, supra note 20.
141 Id.
142 Dafna Linzer, U.S.: Cease-fire justifies action, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 2, 2002).
1 Id.
[Vol. 32:199
ROGUE STATES, WMD, AND TERRORISM
relevant facts against the standards and purposes of the Charter,"' 44 it seems
likely that Saddam's actions are sufficiently egregious and the cause suffi-
ciently aligned with the principles of the Charter to warrant military action.
Such justification would be self-defeating, however. Though the above
arguments are premised on the importance of adhering to international law, the
underlying transgression is the deviation from Security Council mandates. Iraq
has repeatedly violated international law because it has refused to follow
Security Council Resolution requirements. If this refusal has dishonored the
terms of the cease-fire, it has dishonored a cease-fire created by the Security
Council. Yet, by definition, unilateral action by the United States comes
without Security Council approval. A paradox emerges: can the United States
act without Security Council consent to punish a country that does not obey
Security Council demands? These arguments lose much of their moral
imperative when viewed in this light.
Of course, neither humanitarian intervention nor securing compliance with
international law were the primary motivations behind the U.S. military
invasion. Rather, post-9/11 United States has initiated the war on terror to
prevent future attacks and to destroy al-Qaeda. Justifying a defensive invasion
of Iraq can be (and to some extent was) done two different ways. One
possibility is that Saddam was connected with al-Qaeda and thus was a passive
participant in the 9/11 attacks. The second possibility is the more conventional
argument of preemptive self-defense against some future attack.
President Bush argued numerous times after 9/11 that there was a
connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq.'45 He accused Iraq of providing aid
and shelter to the terrorist group, and noted a purported meeting between one
of the 9/11 hijackers and an Iraqi intelligence agent."46 Though the United
States made no assertion that Iraq helped plan or execute the 9/11 attacks, it
attempted to bolster its position based upon the supposed Iraq and al-Qaeda
144 Sofaer, supra note 96, at 11.
'4 Romesh Ratnesar, Iraq & al-Qaeda Is There a Link?, TIME (Aug. 26, 2002), available at
http://www.cnn.corn2002/ALLPOLITICS/08/26/time.iraq/index.html. See also Associated
Press, U.S.: al-Qaida Figure Moved Through Iraq (Feb. 1, 2003), at http://www.abcnews.go.
com/wire/US/ ap20030201_.23 1 html ("The movements of a suspected senior al-Qaida operative
through Iraq are a key component of the Bush administration's suggestions that Saddam Hussein
and the terror network may have some links, U.S. officials say."); President George Bush, State
of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://abcnews.go.com/sectionslus/
DailyNewslsotu-transcriptsbush.html ("Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communica-
tions, and statements by people now in custody, reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects
terrorists, including members of al-Qaeda.").
146 Ratnesar, supra note 145.
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connection. "47 If this connection was made, the United States would have had
its justification for war. Security Council Resolution 1368, passed shortly
after 9/11, recognizes the United States' "inherent- right of individual or
collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.'
' 48
Yet this Resolution cannot be used to justify a unilateral expansion of the
war on terror to nations not participating in the 9/11 attacks. 49 The Resolution
was passed to authorize a response to these specific terrorist attacks, not to
allow the United States to unilaterally use force to eradicate all terrorism. 50
For the Resolution to support an attack on Iraq, President Bush would have had
to produce evidence linking Iraq notjust to al-Qaeda, but to the attack on 9/11.
The United States never made such a showing.'5 ' Unless it had done so, self-
defense based upon 9/11 could not be used to justify the invasion.152
The most powerful argument the United States had for war with Iraq is the
necessity of self-defense, which, under the Core Interpretist theory, need not
require an actual attack. Saddam has a well known antipathy for the United
States, and strong evidence existed that he was developing weapons of mass
destruction that could be used against it. 53
... ABCNews, Making The Case (Sept. 26, 2002), at http://abcnews.go.comrsections/us/
DailyNews/IraqpoliticsO20926.html.
President Bush appeared in the Rose Garden today with members of Congress
who support him on Iraq and accused Iraqi President Saddam Hussein of
essentially the same crime he charged the Taliban with: harboring al Qaeda
terrorists. 'The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist
organizations. And there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq,' he said.
Id.
141 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001).
41 Jeffrey Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era: The "War on Terror", 4
SCHOLAR 209, 232 (2002).
150 id.
"5 Ratnesar, supra note 145 ("CIA officials, while not ruling anything out, say meaningful
ties between Saddam and bin Laden are tenuous at best. Members of Congress who have been
well briefed have seen no smoking gun.").
152 Jonathan Charney, Editorial Comments: The Use of Force Against Terrorism and
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 835, 836 (2001)
Any state that seeks to invoke the right of self-defense should be required to
fumish the international community with credible evidence that... the entity
against which the right of self-defense is exercised was the source of the
attack .... The alleged credibility of conclusory statements by a state's
leadership should not be a sufficient basis for actions in self-defense since it
would encourage abuse.
Id.
153 CNN, CIA: Iraq Could Have Nuclear Weapon in a Year (Oct. 5, 2002), at http://www.
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The classic definition of the appropriate use of this doctrine was articulated
in the mid-nineteenth century by then-Secretary of State Daniel Webster, who
"adjudged military preemption permissible if the danger threatened was
'instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for
deliberation.' "154 While this definition certainly states the preferable level of
exigency for the use of military force, it comes from a time before weapons of
mass destruction. Their introduction into a conflict makes imminent necessity
obsolete."5 To wait for an enemy to acquire, much less threaten to use,
weapons of mass destruction risks exactly that: mass destruction. In light of
the changing nature of self-defense and the threats faced, the Core Interpretist
doctrine allowed a preemptive attack on Iraq.
Saddam' s history suggested that he would not hesitate to use these weapons
so long as their use enabled him to retain power." He refrained from using
them in 1991 due to the American threat to retaliate to any chemical attack
with nuclear weapons.'57 In theory, therefore, he was unlikely to ever use them
openly against the United States. Not only was Saddam's military capability
limited, but past history taught him that their use would bring about his
removal. This logic is used by advocates of 'containment,' saying that military
intervention is unnecessary and unjustified.'58
While this argument may have governed in 1991, it no longer holds true in
today's environment. 59 Even if Saddam would never have used weapons of
mass destruction against America for fear of his own destruction, he could
potentially have passed them to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and
concealed his role in their use."6 Al-Qaeda has already been linked to other
attempts at obtaining weapons of mass destruction,' 6' and its previous attacks
on the United States demonstrate that it would not hesitate to use them if given
access.
cnn.com/2002/US/IO/05/iraq.cia/index.htmi (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).
u Beres, supra note 110, at 128.
'" Arend, supra note 85, at 750.
156 Romesh Ratnesar, Can They Strike Back?, TIME, Feb. 3, 2003, at 42.
151 Id. at 43.
358 France, Germany Stand Firm on Iraq, supra note 122.
Bush, supra note 145 ("Before September the 11th, many in the world believed that
Saddam Hussein could be contained. But chemical agents, lethal viruses, and shadowy terrorist
networks are not easily contained.").
60 Id. ("Secretly, and without fingerprints, [Saddam] could provide one of his hidden
weapons to terrorists, or help them develop their own.").
363 CNN, Bush Warns of Potential 'Evil Weapons' (Nov. 6, 2001), at http://www.cnn.conl
2001/US/i l/06/bush.terror/index.html.
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Though no evidence existed showing a high level connection between Iraq
and al-Qaeda,"6' they do possess "similar interests-hatred of Israel, hostility
toward the rulers of Saudi Arabia and, especially, enmity toward their common
nemesis, the U.S.' 63 The present fragmentation between these two groups
with such a shared goal is too uncertain to preclude military action."
Though it may not have been inevitable that Saddam would give covert aid
to al-Qaeda, his longstanding determination to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and his enmity towards the United States presented too grave a risk
to sit and hope otherwise. This potentially deadly combination, given all the
relevant information gathered on both Iraq and al-Qaeda, was sufficient
justification for a preemptive self-defense invasion under the Core Interpretist
Theory of international law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, due to the Cold War and the obstructionist politics that
accompanied it, development of international law has been somewhat
retarded. 65 As a result, there is not much Security Council precedent dealing
with proper uses of force. Therefore, it is difficult to say which of the above
interpretations of the UN Charter governs.
Perhaps, in time, the UN will grow into its role as arbiter of world disputes,
and the Security Council will govern all uses of force. If the UN remains
relevant and deals with future crisis with success, that outcome becomes more
likely. Today, however, the Security Council has yet to prove that it is
prepared to take all necessary measures to ensure that justice, not only peace,
prevails."6 Should the Security Council impose a limit on the use of force that
frustrates a nation's ability to defend itself, its role will be marginalized as the
state will place its own survival above adherence to international law.
To some extent, the UN has recognized this problem and adopted a Core
Interpretist approach to unauthorized use of force. 7 For example, the 1993
military strike against Iraq in response to its assassination attempt on former
162 Ratnesar, supra note 145.
163 Id.
'" Bush, supra note 145 ("If [an Iraqi and aJ-Qaeda union is] permitted to fully and suddenly
emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come too late. Trusting in the sanity
and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.").
"6 Franck, supra note 71.
166 Arend, supra note 81, at 10.
167 Sofaer, supra note 96.
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President George Bush received widespread support--despite no actual attack
on America.' As in the NATO humanitarian intervention in the Balkans,
even in the absence of a threat to America's security, the use of force was
tacitly accepted by the UN.'69 Perhaps the best illustration of the willingness
of the Security Council to adopt a Core Interpretist view of the Charter is its
"retroactive" authorization of the Economic Community of West Africa States
military intervention in the Liberian Civil War. 71
These tacit recognitions of legitimate military action, no matter how
limited, endorse the validity and necessity of a flexible and interpretive
approach to the UN Charter. The Core Interpretist version of international law
under the UN Charter is the only reading that correctly balances the actual
needs of member nations with the goals of the Charter. Any other approach
would result in the marginalization of the UN, either by overly restricting a
state's ability to survive, or by rejecting international law altogether.
The application of a Core Interpretist vision of the Charter to the just-
completed conflict shows that military intervention in Iraq was justified.
Saddam has a history of procuring, developing, and stockpiling weapons of
mass destruction. He also used them on several occasions, even against his
own people.
Coupled with his apparent determination to possess and willingness to use
these weapons was Saddam's continued defiance of the Security Council
Resolution calling for him to divest himself of these very weapons.17' Indeed,
up to his final moment in power, Saddam never was completely open with the
UN weapons inspectors, although those same inspectors admitted the Iraqis
were becoming more proactive and cooperative. 72
While Saddam's alleged desire to possess weapons of mass destruction was
not new, the world is a different place since 9/11. The United States and the
world have a heightened awareness of terrorism and an increased determina-
tion to prevent it. The capabilities of terrorists to enter the United States and
commit acts of incredible destruction have become all too apparent. The world
168 Hendrickson, supra note 136, at 215-16.
'6 Id. at 218-19.
170 Franck, supra note 71, at 56-57.
' "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the
disarmament which was demanded of it.... ." CNN, Excerpts from the Inspectors' Reports to
the UN (Jan. 27, 2003), at http:l/www.cnn.com/2003fUS/0 127/sprj.irq.excerptslindex.html.
... Hans Blix, Presentation to the U.N. Security Council on the Progress of the Iraqi
Inspections (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/07/sprj.irq.un.
transcript.blix/index.html.
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now knows of al-Qaeda's desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction so that
it may use them against the United States.
Before the war in Iraq, the United States faced two threats. The first,
terrorism, involves future attacks against the West.' In order to inflict
maximum casualties and psychological damage, terrorists are certainly willing
to use weapons of mass destruction. The second, Saddam, was known to
develop the very weapons the terrorists desire, had no scruples about their use,
and shared the same enemy-the United States.
The Core Interpretist theory involves an evaluation of all circumstances and
Charter principles. 74 Such an analysis considers the weapons in question, the
zealous determination of the enemy, the indiscriminate nature of the attacks,
and the potential damage (human, economic, etc.). Prohibiting action because
an alliance between Iraq and al-Qaeda did not then exist was unacceptable.
Such a posture could have given Saddam the necessary freedom to develop
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the opportunity to transfer a weapon
to al-Qaeda if he believed he could do so and remain anonymous. This
connection was not a prerequisite for action, rather, it was a risk the United
States could not take. If such an association developed, it would not be a
question of whether, but when such an attack would be directed against the
United States.
Critics may argue that such reasoning would give the United States the
unbridled discretion to attack any unfriendly country. This assertion is not
true. It is the probability of such a link, not the most remote possibility of one,
that justifies an invasion as a legal exercise of preemptive self-defense. The
United States could not justify an invasion of all unfriendly countries by
alleging a connection with al-Qaeda.
Each instance of preemptive self-defense requires an assessment of the
situation, the history of the antagonists, and the ramifications of each course
of action. Unfortunately, unlike the Core Theory, there is no bright line rule
that brings clarity to the analysis. However, based upon the information
available at the time and the apparent danger Saddam posed to all, the situation
' British police arrested several terrorists with al-Qaeda links that were allegedly plotting
to poison British troops with the deadly poison Ricin. CNN, Ricin suspect 'in al Qaeda camp.'
(Jan. 10,2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europelOl/lO/poison.alqaedaindex.html.
Several other attacks have occurred in Saudi Arabia targeting Westerners as well. CNN, U.S.,
Saudis suspect al Qaeda in Riyadh blasts (May 13, 2003), available at http://www.cnn.comn/
2003/WORLD/meast/05/12/saudi.blast/index.html.
1" Arend, supra note 81.
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that existed gave the United States sufficient justification to use military force
against Iraq.

